§ 1-2z

Citation: § 1-2z
Parent Document: PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford, 350 Conn. 347 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-08-12
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10266509/ppc-realty-llc-v-hartford/ ↗

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We recognize that this outcome results in a lien
       existing on the defendant’s land records that, in some
       circumstances, is potentially invalid if the plaintiff were
       to prevail on its § 8-270a defense and that the plaintiff
       must wait until it is sued by the defendant to assert
       this defense.5 But the legislature has made a clear policy
       decision to make landlords liable in the first instance
       for payments made by municipalities under the act, to
       permit municipalities to enforce this liability through
       a lien on the property and, finally, to permit a landlord to
       raise the affirmative defense only when the municipality
       brings an action against the landlord. See Adesokan v.
       Bloomfield, 347 Conn. 416, 446–47, 297 A.3d 983 (2023)
       (‘‘it is well established that ‘the primary responsibility
       for formulating public policy must remain with the legis-
       lature,’ ’’ and, ‘‘[o]nce the legislature has made its policy
       choice through statute, we are constrained to interpret
       the statutory language, not to decide on and implement
       our own policy choices’’). Nor can we conclude, as the
       trial court did, that our construction of these statutory
       provisions leads to an absurd or unworkable result.
       Concluding that a certain construction of statutory pro-
       visions is bizarre, absurd, or unworkable is strong medi-
       cine. See Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 919 F.3d
       699, 705–706 (2d Cir. 2019) (‘‘[A] statute is not absurd
       merely because it produces results that a court or liti-
       gant finds anomalous or perhaps unwise. To the con-
       trary, courts should look beyond a statute’s text under
       the canon against absurdity only [when] the result of
       applying the plain language would be, in a genuine
       sense, absurd, i.e., [when] it is quite impossible that
       Congress could have intended the result and [when]
       the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be obvious to
       most anyone.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). It
         5
           We offer no opinion on whether the plaintiff would prevail on a § 8-270a
       defense if the defendant were to enforce its lien on the plaintiff’s property
       in a civil action.
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