PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford, 350 Conn. 347 (2024)

Citation: PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford, 350 Conn. 347 (2024)
Parent Document: PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford, 350 Conn. 347 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-08-12
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10266509/ppc-realty-llc-v-hartford/ ↗

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a third party’s arson, not the defendant’s enforcement
         of the local building code, directly caused the residents’
         displacement. The plaintiff contends that the arsonist
         caused the tenants’ displacement because it was the
         fire and smoke that first prompted residents to leave
         the building, and the defendant posted notice of code
         violations after that.
            These statutory questions arise out of the plaintiff’s
         application under § 49-51 to discharge the defendant’s
         lien. A lien’s validity is typically a ‘‘mixed question of
         fact and law.’’ PNC Bank, N.A. v. Kelepecz, 289 Conn.
         692, 697, 960 A.2d 563 (2008). If the underlying facts
         are undisputed, as they are here, however, the lien’s
         validity presents an issue of law, hinging upon the inter-
         pretation of the applicable statutes. See id. Our review
         is therefore plenary. We interpret statutes pursuant to
         General Statutes § 1-2z, which directs us ‘‘to consider
         the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
         statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
         such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
         unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable
         results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
         statute shall not be considered.’’ (Internal quotation
         marks omitted.) Gilmore v. Pawn King, Inc., 313 Conn.
         535, 542–43, 98 A.3d 808 (2014).
            In our view, § 8-267 (3) (B) unambiguously provides
         that it was the defendant’s enforcement of building
         codes that triggered the act’s protections. A plain read-
         ing of § 8-267 (3) (B) reveals that a displaced person
         is one ‘‘who . . . moves as the direct result of code
         enforcement activities . . . .’’ As this court has pre-
         viously recognized when considering who is a ‘‘dis-
         placed person’’ under the act, there will always be an
         underlying cause that initially brought about the need
         for building code enforcement. See Dukes v. Durante,
         192 Conn. 207, 221, 471 A.2d 1368 (1984) (‘‘[w]hether
         condemnation results from burst pipes or falling ceil-
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