PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford, 350 Conn. 347 (2024)

Citation: PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford, 350 Conn. 347 (2024)
Parent Document: PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford, 350 Conn. 347 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-08-12
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10266509/ppc-realty-llc-v-hartford/ ↗

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ECKER, J., concurring. I agree with the majority’s
          construction of the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act
          (URAA), General Statutes §§ 8-266 through 8-282, and
          its conclusion that the affirmative defense in General
          Statutes § 8-270a is applicable only in a civil action for
          the reimbursement of displacement costs, but does not
          preclude the imposition of a lien on the landlord’s prop-
          erty pursuant to General Statutes §§ 8-268 (a) and 8-
          270 (a). I disagree with the majority, however, that this
          conclusion is dictated by the plain and unambiguous
          language of the URAA. In my view, the inclusion of an
          affirmative defense in § 8-270a, but the exclusion of
          such a defense in the lien provisions of §§ 8-268 (a)
          and 8-270 (a), renders the statutory scheme ambiguous
          because it is plausible that a landlord with a valid affir-
          mative defense under § 8-270a is not ‘‘liable for any
          payments made [under the URAA]’’ and, therefore, that
          the lien ‘‘to secure repayment to the town, city or bor-
          ough or the state of such payments’’ is invalid. General
          Statutes § 8-268 (a); accord General Statutes § 8-270 (a);
            7
              Both parties raise additional arguments about whether the plaintiff can
          assert the affirmative defense in § 8-270a, including whether the plaintiff
          even violated § 47a-7 in the first place. We do not reach these arguments
          because we conclude that the affirmative defense set forth in § 8-270a is
          not available to the plaintiff in this action.
see, e.g., Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc., 338 Conn. 687,
698, 258 A.3d 1268 (2021) (if text of statute ‘‘allows
for more than one plausible meaning,’’ we ‘‘deem it
ambiguous for purposes of the [General Statutes] § 1-
2z analysis’’). See generally Seramonte Associates, LLC
v. Hamden, 345 Conn. 76, 112–118, 282 A.3d 1253 (2022)
(Ecker, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining
importance of proper interpretative methodology under
§ 1-2z).
   That said, I am persuaded that the better reading of
the relevant statutes resolves this case in favor of the
defendant, the city of Hartford. The defendant’s con-
struction of the relevant statutes’ texts and their interre-
lationship is more plausible for the reasons ably recited
in the majority opinion. My review of extratextual evi-
dence of legislative intent reinforces this view; as the
majority observes, ‘‘the relevant legislative history indi-
cates that the legislature passed § 8-270a and the lien
provisions in §§ 8-268 and 8-270 with full awareness
that landlords would still be liable to municipalities in
the first instance for relocation costs under circum-
stances in which landlords were not at fault.’’ Footnote
4 of the majority opinion; see 25 H.R. Proc., Pt. 16, 1982
Sess., pp. 5370–71, remarks of Representatives Thomas
P. Brunnock and Paul J. Garavel. Accordingly, I concur
in the majority opinion. --- 020lead ---

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