PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford, 350 Conn. 347 (2024)

Citation: PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford, 350 Conn. 347 (2024)
Parent Document: PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford, 350 Conn. 347 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-08-12
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10266509/ppc-realty-llc-v-hartford/ ↗

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two actions to secure the recovery of their relocation
expenses from a landlord: they can place a lien on a
landlord’s property under §§ 8-268 (a) and 8-270 (a),
and they can commence a civil action under § 8-270a.
As an affirmative defense to the civil action, the final
sentence of § 8-270a permits a landlord to avoid liability
if the displacement was not the result of the landlord’s
violation of § 47a-7. The question before us is whether
the plaintiff can invoke the shield provided in this final
sentence of § 8-270a and use it as a sword in this applica-
tion to render the lien invalid.
We conclude that the text of §§ 8-268 (a) and 8-270
(a) unambiguously forecloses the plaintiff’s use of the
affirmative defense provided by § 8-270a in connection
with its application to declare invalid and to discharge
the defendant’s lien. The legislature provided § 8-270a
only as an affirmative defense to a civil action seeking
to recover relocation costs. It did not include any similar
language in §§ 8-268 and 8-270, which permit a munici-
pality to place a lien on the property. We cannot second-
guess the legislature’s policy decision to permit a munic-
ipality to impose a lien without permitting resistance
to it by a landlord. In short, the plaintiff attempts in this
action to take advantage, prematurely, of an affirmative
defense it might have if the defendant were to bring
a cause of action to recover relocation costs. If the
legislature had intended to permit a landlord to invoke
§ 8-270a affirmatively to seek to invalidate a lien, it
could have easily said so. See, e.g., 9 Pettipaug, LLC
v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 349 Conn. 268,
284, 316 A.3d 318 (2024). To agree with the plaintiff’s
argument, we would have to graft language onto these
statutes that does not exist, which we decline to do.
See State v. Wilchinski, 242 Conn. 211, 232, 700 A.2d
1 (1997) (declining to graft language onto statutes).
The trial court allowed the plaintiff to use the affirma-
tive defense provided in § 8-270a offensively to dis-
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