PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford, 350 Conn. 347 (2024)

Citation: PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford, 350 Conn. 347 (2024)
Parent Document: PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford, 350 Conn. 347 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-08-12
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10266509/ppc-realty-llc-v-hartford/ ↗

Full Text

2,377 chars

because the building was ‘‘[u]nfit for [h]uman [o]ccu-
pancy.’’ Once the defendant issued that order, the resi-
dents became displaced as a ‘‘direct result of code
enforcement activities’’ under § 8-267 (3) (B). This is
the most sensible reading in light of the legislatively
declared purpose of the act, which includes ‘‘establish[-
ing] a uniform policy for the fair and equitable treatment
of persons displaced . . . by building code enforce-
ment activities . . . .’’ General Statutes § 8-266. Even
though the arson destroyed the property, there was
some danger that residents of the building would seek
to return if they had no other place for shelter. It was
the defendant’s code enforcement that directly resulted
in the displacement of the tenants.
Although damage from the fire made the apartment
building uninhabitable physically and legally, those two
determinations are not always necessarily one and the
same. For example, the existence of mold growing in
an apartment building might make the building legally
uninhabitable; see General Statutes § 47a-7; but may go
unnoticed by residents who might choose to stay in the
building despite the health risk because they have no
other shelter options. In this scenario, too, it would not
be the underlying cause behind the code violation (the
mold) that prompted residents to move. Rather, if the
defendant, in enforcing its code, ordered that residents
could not occupy the building, the residents would be
displaced as a ‘‘direct result’’ of the code enforcement.
General Statutes § 8-267 (3) (B). This reality under-
scores the shortcomings of the plaintiff’s logic and fur-
ther supports an interpretation of § 8-267 (3) (B) that
considers only code enforcement activities when
determining the cause of displacement under the act.
Thus, we disagree with the trial court that the resi-
dents ‘‘move[d]’’ from the building ‘‘as the direct result
of’’ arson, not ‘‘as the direct result of [the defendant’s]
code enforcement activities . . . .’’ General Statutes
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

Other Sections in This Document (198)

Full Text