Section 8

Citation: Section 8
Parent Document: Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2017-10-18
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4435296/theodore-hayes-v-philip-harvey/ ↗

Other Sections in This Document (260)

Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
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opinion—by citing dicta, no less—is strange, given that I do
not rely on it. It remains the case, though, that the Feemster
district court, like the others cited above, found a right to
remain, and that the majority still has no other court agreeing
with its interpretation.
       12
          Many of these cases address more specifically the
question, not at issue in this appeal, whether when a tenant has
exercised her right to remain, the landlord must accept the
enhanced vouchers as payment of their rent. See, e.g., Estevez,
2005 WL 3164146 at *4 n.2. But their analysis necessarily
discusses the existence and, to some extent, scope of the right
to remain that the majority denies exists in the statute. Though
only Park Village is on all fours with this appeal, these other
cases are instructive.