Section 8
- Citation
- Section 8
- Parent Document
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
- Jurisdiction
- United States (federal)
- Effective Date
- 2017-10-18
Other Sections in This Document (260)
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- § 1437f
- § 1437f
- § 1437f
- § 1437f
- § 1437f
- § 1487f
- § 1487f
- § 1487f
- § 1487f
- § 1487f
- § 1487f
- § 1487f
- § 1487f
- § 1437f
- § 1437f
- § 1437f
- § 1437f
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
Full Text
1,036 charsThe text of the statute, as well as its history and structure, makes clear that Congress has granted enhanced voucher holders a right to remain. The majority’s interpretation of the statute, which holds that Congress offered tenants no new right when it amended the enhanced voucher statute to provide that tenants “may elect to remain” in their homes, is plainly foreclosed. As between “some right to remain” and “no right to remain,” Congress’s choice is clear. But as is often the case, the text does not detail the precise bounds of that right to remain: that task has been left to the courts and to HUD, both of which have undertaken it. The majority declines the responsibility here. 7 Because Congress chose to use solely the “may elect to remain” language, rather than a detailed elaboration of the right to remain, it has left a gap in the statute. “Filling these gaps . . . involves difficult policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make than courts,” Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet