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Section 8

Citation
Section 8
Parent Document
Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
Effective Date
2017-10-18
Original Source
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4435296/theodore-hayes-v-philip-harvey/ ↗

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               amount of rental assistance
               provided on behalf of the family
               shall be determined using a
               payment standard that is equal to
               the rent for the dwelling unit (as
               such rent may be increased from
               time-to-time) . . . .
§ 1437f(t)(1)(B). The language “the assisted family may elect
to remain” plainly does not limit property owners’ nonrenewal
rights. Our dissenting colleague, however, suggests that it
does, because “extending this right to a tenant necessarily
limits the rights of a landlord: if a statute guarantees tenants
hot water, it also limits a property owner’s right not to install
hot water plumbing.” Dissenting Op. at 4. This analogy is
inapt. The statute does not guarantee the tenant an
unconditional right to remain at the property. Rather, it
guarantees the tenant the financial support necessary to pay a
higher rent if the lease is renewed. Nowhere does the statute
require the landlord to renew the tenant’s lease indefinitely.
        We recognize that a “statute should be construed to give
effect to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
superfluous, void or insignificant,” Corley v. United States,
556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009), that § 1437f(c)(8)(A) already
provides a right to remain during the year following a property
owner’s notice of opt-out from a project-based program, and
that § 524(d) of the Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and
Affordability Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-65, tit. V, subtit. A,
111 Stat. 1344, 1408–09 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1437f note), already obligates HUD to provide enhanced
vouchers to eligible families. Still, for the reasons that follow,
we do not believe that declining to require property owners to
continuously renew enhanced-voucher tenancies renders the
“may elect” language superfluous or otherwise meaningless.