Section 8
- Citation
- Section 8
- Parent Document
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
- Jurisdiction
- United States (federal)
- Effective Date
- 2017-10-18
Other Sections in This Document (260)
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
- Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- § 1437f
- § 1437f
- § 1437f
- § 1437f
- § 1437f
- § 1487f
- § 1487f
- § 1487f
- § 1487f
- § 1487f
- § 1487f
- § 1487f
- § 1487f
- § 1437f
- § 1437f
- § 1437f
- § 1437f
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
- Section 8
Full Text
1,340 charsBut in 2000, Congress amended the enhanced voucher statute and added the “may elect to remain” language. Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. 106-246 § 2801, 114 Stat. 511 (2000). Congress changed the enhanced voucher, adding new language and providing tenants new protections. See also Park Vill. Apartment Tenants Ass’n v. Mortimer Howard Tr., 636 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[I]n 2000, Congress amended the enhanced voucher provision to make it even more protective of tenants.”) (emphasis added). This legislative action must be given meaning, effect, and force. “When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.” Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995). An interpretation of the enhanced voucher statute that treats the “may elect to remain” language as mere scene-setting for the operative discussion of rent calculations renders the 2000 version of the statute indistinguishable from the 1999 version of the statute. Congress intended that its amendment change the meaning of the statute. Our interpretation must effectuate that enactment. By providing that tenants “may elect to remain” in their homes, Congress must have given them-some right that they did not enjoy previously: specifically, a right to remain.