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Section 8

Citation
Section 8
Parent Document
Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (2017)
Effective Date
2017-10-18
Original Source
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4435296/theodore-hayes-v-philip-harvey/ ↗

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  It is the existence of the HAP contract and related lease that
subject Harvey to section 8. See Powell v. Hous. Auth. of City
of Pittsburgh, 812 A.2d 1201, 1203 (Pa. 2002) (explaining that
if the “PHA approves the tenancy, the PHA and the owner enter
into a [HAP] contract . . . under which the PHA makes rental
payments to subsidize occupancy,” and, in turn, “the owner
and the now-Section 8 participant enter into a lease for the
subsidized unit”); see also U.S. ex rel. Richards v. R & T
Investments LLC, 29 F. Supp. 3d 553, 562 (W.D. Pa. 2014)
(stating that an owner “must enter into” a HAP contract “[t]o
receive assistance payments”). The dissent states “other courts
have held that the enhanced voucher statute can impose
requirements even on landlords who are not covered by a HAP
contract.” Dissenting Op. at 2 n.1 (citing Park Vill. Apartment
Tenants Ass’n v. Mortimer Howard Tr., 636 F.3d 1150, 1161–
62 (9th Cir. 2011)). The section of Park Village cited for this
proposition, however, pertains to whether the District Court
erred in granting a mandatory injunction requiring an owner to
enter into a HAP contract, “despite opting out of Section 8.”
Park Vill., 636 F.3d at 1161. There, the Ninth Circuit held that
an owner was free to execute a HAP contract if he so chose; if
he did, he was entitled to “fair market rent via enhanced
vouchers,” but if not, he would forgo “significant rental
income,” while avoiding obligations imposed by HAP
contracts. Id. at 1161–62. Here, it is evident that the rights and
duties under section 8 are set forth in the HAP contract and
related lease.