Abril-Rivera v. Johnson, 806 F.3d 599 (2015)

Citation: Abril-Rivera v. Johnson, 806 F.3d 599 (2015)
Parent Document: Abril-Rivera v. Johnson, 806 F.3d 599 (2015)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2015-11-17
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3155371/abril-rivera-v-johnson/ ↗

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The first set of complaints is far too temporally remote from the challenged actions to support an inference of causality. “The cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an employer’s knowledge of a protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal, proximity must be ‘very close.’ ” Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001) (noting that periods of three and four months have been held insufficient). In Breeden, the Court held that “[a]etion taken ... 20 months later suggests, by itself, no causality at all.” Id. at 274, 121 S.Ct. 1508. Here, over 14 months elapsed between the last EEO complaint regarding pay and the implementation of the rotational staffing system during repairs. That is too long to support an inference that the complaints led to a decision to reduce staffing during fire-safety related repairs. See Shinseki, 629 F.3d at 58 (“Without some corroborating evidence suggestive of causation ... a gap of several months cannot alone ground an inference of a causal connection between a complaint and an allegedly retaliatory action.”); Morón-Barradas v. Dep’t of Educ. of Commonwealth of P.R., 488 F.3d 472, 481 (1st Cir.2007) (“[M]ore than eight months ... is ... insufficient to establish temporal proximity.”).

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