Abril-Rivera v. Johnson, 806 F.3d 599 (2015)

Citation: Abril-Rivera v. Johnson, 806 F.3d 599 (2015)
Parent Document: Abril-Rivera v. Johnson, 806 F.3d 599 (2015)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2015-11-17
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3155371/abril-rivera-v-johnson/ ↗

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Title VII also makes it unlawful ‘“for employers to retaliate against persons who complain about unlawfully discriminatory employment practices.’ ” Ahern v. Shinseki, 629 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir.2010) (quoting Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 88 (1st Cir.2005)). To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must make a three-part showing: “(1) she engaged in protected activity under Title VII, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) the adverse employment action was causally connected to the protected activity.” Gerald v. Univ. of P.R., 707 F.3d 7, 24 (1st Cir.2013). A “retaliation claim may be viable even if the underlying discrimination claim is not,” because “the employment activity or practice that [the plaintiff) opposed need not be a Title VII violation so long as [the plaintiff] had a reasonable belief that it was, and he communicated that belief to his employer in good faith.” See Benoit v. Tech. Mfg. Corp., 331 F.3d 166, 174-75 (1st Cir.2003). “Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2528, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013).10

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