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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Abril-Rivera v. Johnson, 806 F.3d 599 (2015)

Citation
Abril-Rivera v. Johnson, 806 F.3d 599 (2015)
Parent Document
Abril-Rivera v. Johnson, 806 F.3d 599 (2015)
Effective Date
2015-11-17

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“Title VII prohibits both intentional discrimination (known as ‘disparate treatment’) as well as, in some cases, practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities (known as ‘disparate impact’).” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009). As far as we can tell, plaintiffs have not provided record evidence showing that they are actually of Puerto Rican ancestry and origin, such as to meet the definition of members of a protected minority group under Title VII. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (defining “national origin discrimination” as including “denial of equal employment opportunity because of an individual’s, or his or her ancestor’s, place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group”). That the plaintiffs simply worked for FEMA in Puerto Rico&emdash;without evidence of their membership in a protected class&emdash; would not suffice for a national origin-based disparate impact claim. See Vitalis v. Sun Constructors, Inc., 481 Fed.Appx. 718, 721 (3d Cir.2012) (noting that “ ‘locals’ or ‘local Virgin Islanders’ ” did not constitute a protected group based on national origin because “[n]o evidence demonstrated that all of the local residents of St. Croix share a ‘unique historical, political and/or social circumstance[ ]’ ” (second alteration in original)). For purposes of our analysis, however, we can assume without deciding that plaintiffs have satisfied this threshold element, as their claim fails on other grounds. Cf. Candelario Ramos v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. of P.R., 360 F.3d *60653, 56 (1st Cir.2004) (proceeding on this assumption).