§ 42-3505

Citation: § 42-3505
Parent Document: Reshard v. Stevenson (2022)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 2022-02-24
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6444934/reshard-v-stevenson/ ↗

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constitute defenses, we address those arguments infra in Section II.C.
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           Although none of the analysis in the trial court’s order speaks to Ms.
Reshard’s promptness in seeking relief or whether she had actual notice of the
proceedings, those factors may be relatively straightforward in this case, permitting
a “less formal” inquiry by the trial court. See Wylie, 143 A.3d at 84 (“An inquiry
may be less formal if the facts are undisputed or immaterial . . . .”). As to
promptness, Ms. Reshard filed her Rule 60(b) motion four days after the initial
hearing at which a default was entered against her. Cf., e.g., Pfeister-Barter, Inc. v.
Laois, 499 A.2d 915, 916 (D.C. 1985) (per curiam) (considering a Rule 60(b) motion
“promptly filed” where the movant filed within three weeks of the judgment). As to
actual notice, there is little doubt that Ms. Reshard had actual notice of the suit and
of the February 8 initial hearing. Nevertheless, the crux of this factor is “whether
the movant willfully neglected her obligation to litigate.” Wylie, 143 A.3d at 85.
Where, as here, “the movant’s failure to appear at a particular hearing prompts a
default judgment or the dismissal of a case, the actual notice factor asks whether that
failure to appear resulted from the movant’s deliberate neglect of her litigation
responsibilities.” Id. In her Rule 60(b) motion, Ms. Reshard stated that it was her
understanding that continuances to obtain counsel would be granted whether or not
a tenant appeared at the initial hearing. The trial court should consider on remand
whether Ms. Reshard’s failure to appear was the result of a misunderstanding rather
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