Reshard v. Stevenson (2022)

Citation: Reshard v. Stevenson (2022)
Parent Document: Reshard v. Stevenson (2022)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 2022-02-24
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6444934/reshard-v-stevenson/ ↗

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3
          In relevant part, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) protects
individuals serving in the military from default judgments. Under the SCRA, a court
“shall require the plaintiff to file with the court an affidavit . . . stating whether or
not the defendant is in military service” before entering judgment for a plaintiff
based on a defendant’s nonappearance. 50 U.S.C. § 3931(b)(1)(A). The Superior
Court Landlord and Tenant Rules reflect this requirement, such that a default
becomes final as a judgment only upon the filing of a form the Superior Court has
created to comply with the SCRA. See Super. Ct. L&T R. 14(c)(1). Ms. Stevenson
filed this form on February 15, 2018. The next day, the court docketed a default
judgment for possession in favor of Ms. Stevenson.
      4
          Ms. Reshard titled this motion a “motion to vacate default judgment, for
reconsideration of motion to continue the initial hearing in order to obtain counsel,
and other relief.” As noted supra in note 3, the default was not yet a default judgment
at the time Ms. Reshard filed this motion. Different standards apply to setting aside
a default and setting aside a default judgment. See Miranda v. Contreras, 754 A.2d
277, 280 n.4 (D.C. 2000). Nevertheless, “once judgment was entered[,] [Ms.
Reshard’s] argument was subject to [the standards applicable to setting aside default
judgments].” Id.

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