Section 52-196a

Citation: Section 52-196a
Parent Document: Robinson v. V. D. (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-11-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282961/robinson-v-v-d/ ↗

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incidents. In such a case, the legislature is acting within
       its historic and traditional function of defining rights
       and prescribing remedies.’’ Fishman v. Middlesex
       Mutual Assurance Co., 4 Conn. App. 339, 356, 494 A.2d
       606, cert. denied, 197 Conn. 806, 499 A.2d 57, and cert.
       denied, 197 Conn. 807, 499 A.2d 57 (1985). Section 52-
       196a clearly falls within this category of statute and,
       despite including procedural directives, does not offend
       principles of separation of power.
          The plaintiffs have not claimed that § 52-196a con-
       flicts with any existing rules of practice or procedure
       promulgated by the Superior Court. Moreover, although
       the promulgation and adoption of rules of practice
       clearly fall within the power of the Judicial Branch; see
       General Statutes § 51-14; it is not a power that lies
       exclusively within judicial control. At times, the legisla-
       ture may promulgate statutes that contain procedures
       to be employed by the courts of this state. We simply
       are unconvinced that § 52-196a significantly interferes
       with the orderly functioning of the Superior Court’s
       judicial role. As we have indicated, the statute is really
       no more than a form of summary judgment. See Elder
       v. Kauffman, supra, 204 Conn. App. 824. In short, we
       reject the plaintiffs’ alternative ground for affirming the
       court’s decision to deny the special motion to dismiss,
       as that ruling pertains to the vexatious litigation counts
       to the extent those counts are premised on the defen-
       dant’s statements and/or actions in pursuing a civil pro-
       tection order.
          To summarize, we conclude that all counts of the
       complaint, with the exception of the counts sounding
       in common-law and statutory vexatious litigation, are
       barred by absolute immunity under the litigation privi-
       lege. With respect to the vexatious litigation counts, we
       affirm in part and reverse in part the court’s decision
       to deny the special motion to dismiss as to those counts,
       concluding that the court should have granted the
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