Robinson v. V. D. (2024)

Citation: Robinson v. V. D. (2024)
Parent Document: Robinson v. V. D. (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-11-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282961/robinson-v-v-d/ ↗

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from a claim of vexatious litigation.’’ Id., 347. The court
          noted that the stringent requirements that a plaintiff
          must establish, including that the prior proceeding was
          initiated by the defendant against the plaintiff and had
          terminated in the plaintiff’s favor, ‘‘provide adequate
          room for both appropriate incentives to report wrong-
          doing and protection of the injured party’s interest in
          being free from unwarranted litigation. Thus, because
          the tort of vexatious litigation strikes the proper bal-
          ance, it is unnecessary to apply an additional layer of
          protection to would-be litigants in the form of absolute
          immunity.’’ Id.
             For the reasons provided, we conclude that, with the
          exception of the statutory and common-law vexatious
          litigation counts, all counts of the plaintiffs’ underlying
          complaint are barred by absolute immunity under the
          litigation privilege and, therefore, must be dismissed.
          Because, however, the vexatious litigation counts are
          not subject to dismissal on that same ground, we still
          must consider whether the court improperly failed to
          dismiss those counts pursuant to the defendant’s spe-
          cial motion to dismiss.
                                       II
             In addition to invoking absolute immunity, the defen-
          dant claims that the trial court improperly denied his
          special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to § 52-196a
          on the ground that the conduct alleged in the complaint
          failed to relate to a matter of public concern and, thus,
          fell outside of the protections afforded by § 52-196a.
          For the reasons that follow, we agree that the trial court
          should have granted the special motion to dismiss in
          part because, with respect to the alleged statements
          made in connection with the grievance proceeding, the
          defendant’s conduct related to the exercise of a pro-
          tected right in connection with a matter of public con-
          cern, and the plaintiffs cannot, as a matter of law, estab-
          lish probable cause that they can prevail on their
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