Section 52-196a

Citation: Section 52-196a
Parent Document: Robinson v. V. D. (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-11-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282961/robinson-v-v-d/ ↗

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A vexatious litigation action brought either pursuant
       to the common law or pursuant to General Statutes
       § 52-568 requires the prior commencement of a civil
       action and termination of that civil action in the plain-
       tiffs’ favor. The Supreme Court has held that proceed-
       ings initiated ‘‘before an administrative board that has
       power to take action adversely affecting the legally
       protected interests of [another]’’ can satisfy the prior
       action requirement. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
       DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 248, 597
       A.2d 807 (1991). The plaintiffs, however, cannot rely
       on the defendant’s initiation of the grievance proceed-
       ings as satisfying the prior action requirement for the
       purposes of their statutory and common-law vexatious
       litigation counts because the union grievance was not
       an action brought against the plaintiffs, such as in a
       civil or administrative action. Rather, a union grievance
       is directed at the employer, claiming a breach of the
       collective bargaining agreement. Because the plaintiffs
       cannot, as a matter of law, demonstrate probable cause
       that they would prevail on their vexatious litigation
       counts with respect to the allegation pertaining to the
       grievance proceedings, the special motion to dismiss
       should be granted in part.
                                     III
          Finally, because we conclude that a portion of the
       plaintiffs’ vexatious litigation counts are subject to dis-
       missal pursuant to § 52-196a, we also must consider the
       plaintiffs’ alternative ground for affirming the court’s
       denial of the special motion to dismiss; namely, that
       § 52-196a is unconstitutional, both facially and as
       applied. The plaintiffs first argue that the statute
       requires the court to make factual findings that ought to
       be left to a jury, and, thus, the statute is unconstitutional
       because it deprives them of their state and federal con-
       stitutional rights to a jury trial and to petition for griev-
       ances. See Conn. Const., art. I, §§ 6, 10, and 19; U.S.
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