special motion to dismiss, the trial court declined to
address it.7 Ordinarily, ‘‘[o]nly in [the] most exceptional
circumstances can and will [an appellate] court con-
sider a claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has not
been raised and decided in the trial court. . . . A claim
that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, however,
may be raised at any time during the proceedings,
including for the first time on appeal.’’ (Citations omit-
ted; emphasis added; footnote omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Mangiafico v. Farmington, 331
Conn. 404, 429–30, 204 A.3d 1138 (2019). Because the
defendant’s absolute immunity claim implicates the trial
7
The court reasoned that, despite the defendant having expressly stated
in the opening paragraph of his special motion to dismiss that the motion
was brought ‘‘[p]ursuant to Practice Book §§ 10-6 and 10-30, and [General
Statutes] § 52-196a,’’ he had failed expressly to request that the court treat
his motion as ‘‘a hybrid motion, combining a special motion to dismiss
with a standard motion to dismiss.’’ The court further indicated that other
Superior Court decisions had expressed a general disfavor for hybrid
motions, albeit in other contexts, because our rules of practice do not
expressly authorize them. The court concluded: ‘‘Given the expedited time
requirements pertaining to a statutory special motion to dismiss, the limited
inquiry of a special motion to dismiss, and the defendant’s failure to cogently
argue that his motion incorporated a Practice Book § 10-30 motion to dis-
miss, the court will not recognize this special motion to dismiss as a hybrid
motion nor entertain it as one.’’ Although a court certainly has ‘‘broad
discretion to manage its docket and resolve cases as it sees fit’’; M. B. v.
S. A., 194 Conn. App. 727, 735, 222 A.3d 551 (2019); which arguably would
include the discretion to reject a so-called hybrid motion, it is axiomatic
that questions pertaining to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court ‘‘may
be raised at any time and by any party . . . and that [o]nce . . . raised,
[the challenge] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented.’’
(Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Oxford House at Yale v. Gilligan, 125 Conn. App. 464, 473, 10 A.3d 52 (2010).
Moreover, § 52-196a (h) expressly provides that a party’s use of the statute
‘‘shall not . . . (3) affect, limit or preclude the right of a party filing a special
motion to dismiss to any defense, remedy, immunity or privilege otherwise
authorized by law . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Nevertheless, the defendant
has not raised the trial court’s failure to address his absolute immunity
claim as a claim of error on appeal. Instead, he raises the issue as a matter
for this court to decide in the first instance, and, thus, we do not reach
whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the issue
when raised.
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