Robinson v. V. D. (2024)

Citation: Robinson v. V. D. (2024)
Parent Document: Robinson v. V. D. (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-11-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10282961/robinson-v-v-d/ ↗

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disputing the defendant’s claims, the plaintiffs raise as
       an alternative ground for affirming the denial of the
       special motion to dismiss that § 52-196a violates both
       the state and federal constitutions.4 We conclude that
       the question of whether the plaintiffs’ action is barred
       by absolute immunity under the litigation privilege
       implicates the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction
       and, thus, must be considered prior to addressing the
       merits of the special motion to dismiss. We agree with
       the defendant that, with the exception of those counts
       sounding in vexatious litigation, the complaint is barred
       by absolute immunity. With respect to the remaining
       vexatious litigation counts, we affirm in part and reverse
       in part the court’s decision to deny the special motion
       to dismiss, we reject the plaintiffs’ alternative ground
       for affirmance, and we remand the matter for further
       proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
          The following relevant facts and procedural history,
       which are undisputed for purposes of this appeal, were
       set forth by our Supreme Court in its earlier opinion
       in this matter.5 See Robinson v. V. D., 346 Conn. 1002,
         4
           The plaintiffs argue that § 52-196a is unconstitutional for multiple rea-
       sons. First, both facially and as applied, it deprives them of their state and
       federal constitutional rights to a jury trial and to petition for grievances.
       See Conn. Const., art. I, §§ 6, 10, and 19; U.S. Const., amend. I. Second, they
       argue that the statute violates the separation of legislative and judicial
       powers as set forth in article second and article fifth, § 1, of the constitution
       of Connecticut.
         5
           Our Supreme Court previously transferred this appeal to itself, pursuant
       to Practice Book § 65-1, in order to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ pending motion
       to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. See Robinson v. V. D.,
       346 Conn. 1002, 1003 n.3, 293 A.3d 345 (2023). Our Supreme Court denied
       the motion to dismiss, concluding that a trial court’s denial of a § 52-196a
       special motion to dismiss that raises a colorable claim under our anti-SLAPP
       statute is an immediately appealable final judgment under the second prong
       of the test annunciated in State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566
       (1983). See Robinson v. V. D., supra, 1004. After concluding on the basis
       of its review of the record that the defendant had presented a colorable
       claim, it transferred the appeal back to this court for further proceedings
       on the merits of the appeal. Id., 1011.
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