Altavista Investments, LLC v. Makeeva, 226 Conn. App. 175 (2024)

Citation: Altavista Investments, LLC v. Makeeva, 226 Conn. App. 175 (2024)
Parent Document: Altavista Investments, LLC v. Makeeva, 226 Conn. App. 175 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-06-11
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10131861/altavista-investments-llc-v-makeeva/ ↗

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whether that interest would be impaired by a disposi-
       tion without the involvement of the proposed interve-
       nor. Because these factors are analytically related, we
       consider them together. See Wallingford Center Associ-
       ates v. Board of Tax Review, 68 Conn. App. 803, 812,
       793 A.2d 260 (2002).
          ‘‘Intervention allows one who was not a party in an
       original action to become a party upon his request. He
       has a derivative role by virtue of an action already
       shaped by the original parties. He takes the controversy
       as he finds it and may not introduce his own claims to
       restyle the action. . . . This is all the more true where
       a statute allows intervention for a specified purpose.’’
       (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
       Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, 259 Conn. 131,
       154, 788 A.2d 1158 (2002). Here, although § 47a-35b does
       not expressly provide for the intervention of interested
       parties, it tasks the trial court with holding ‘‘a hearing to
       determine the amount due each party from the accrued
       payments . . . .’’ The statute contains no language indi-
       cating that only the current parties to the summary
       process action may participate in the distribution pro-
       ceedings. See General Statutes § 47a-35b; Franco v.
       East Shore Development, Inc., 271 Conn. 623, 632, 858
       A.2d 703 (2004) (despite use of term ‘‘party’’ in statute
       authorizing statutory proceeding, nonparty intervention
       was permitted in absence of express contrary indica-
       tion). Both common sense and judicial economy dictate
       that an outside entity with a demonstrable claim to a
       share of the distribution should be permitted to inter-
       vene in order to fulfill the purpose of the statute: an
       equitable distribution of the accrued payments.
         In their oppositions to the motion to intervene, nei-
       ther the plaintiff nor the defendants contested Baotou’s
       assertion that it has a contractual right to the use and
       occupancy payments by virtue of Patriot Bank’s assign-
       ment of the loan documents, including the assignment
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