Altavista Investments, LLC v. Makeeva, 226 Conn. App. 175 (2024)

by any party to the litigation. . . . A proposed interve-
       nor must allege sufficient facts, through its motion to
       intervene and the pleadings, to make the requisite show-
       ing of its right to intervene. . . . No additional testi-
       mony or evidence is required. . . . Failure to meet any
       one of the four elements, however, will preclude inter-
       vention as of right.’’ (Citations omitted; footnotes
       added; footnotes in original; footnotes omitted; internal
       quotation marks omitted.) BNY Western Trust v.
       Roman, 295 Conn. 194, 203–206, 990 A.2d 853 (2010).
       For purposes of determining the jurisdictional issue,
       we apply a plenary scope of review as to whether all
       four elements have been met. Id., 207–208 n.12.11
          Baotou’s motion for intervention in the present mat-
       ter is atypical in that it was filed after the court rendered
       a final judgment of possession and sought only to inter-
       vene in postjudgment proceedings regarding distribu-
       tion of use and occupancy payments. Regardless of
       the precise procedural posture of the motion, however,
       when we consider the four elements of the test for
       intervention as of right, we are persuaded not only that
       Baotou demonstrates a colorable claim of intervention
       as of right such that the denial of its motion was a final
       judgment for purposes of appeal, but also that the court
       improperly denied the motion to intervene on its mer-
       its.12 Because the same four factor test applies both to
       the jurisdictional question and to our consideration of
       the merits of the motion to intervene; see In re Santiago
       G., supra, 325 Conn. 231–32; for brevity sake, we com-
       bine our analysis of the four factors.
         11
            Our Supreme Court has clarified that ‘‘[t]he denial of a motion to inter-
       vene as of right raises a question of law and warrants plenary review,
       whereas a denial for permissive intervention is reviewed with an abuse
       of discretion standard.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kerrigan v.
       Commissioner of Public Health, 279 Conn. 447, 454 n.10, 904 A.2d 137 (2006).
         12
            Because we conclude that the court should have permitted Baotou to
       intervene as a matter of right, we do not consider the issue of permissive
       intervention.
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