Altavista Investments, LLC v. Makeeva, 226 Conn. App. 175 (2024)

The first element of the test is whether the motion
          to intervene was timely. ‘‘Whether a motion to intervene
          is timely involves a determination of how long the inter-
          venor was aware of an interest before he or she tried
          to intervene, any prejudicial effect of intervention on
          the existing parties, any prejudicial effect of a denial
          on the applicant and consideration of any unusual cir-
          cumstances either for or against timeliness. . . . Fac-
          tors to consider also include the nature of the interest
          and the purpose for which the intervenor is seeking to
          be brought into the action. . . . [T]here are no absolute
          ways to measure timeliness . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
          marks omitted.) Austin-Casares v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
          America, 310 Conn. 640, 649, 81 A.3d 200 (2013).
            Here, Baotou’s motion to intervene was timely.13 The
          motion to intervene was filed with the trial court during
          the pendency of the appeal from the judgment of posses-
          sion for the express purpose of vindicating rights pursu-
          ant to § 47a-35b, which governs the distribution of
          accrued use and occupancy payments following an
          appeal. Because the trial court was not required to
          hold a hearing in accordance with § 47a-35b until ‘‘final
          disposition of the appeal,’’ and Baotou filed its motion
          to intervene while the appeal was still pending, the
          motion was clearly timely.
            The second and third elements of the test ask whether
          the proposed intervenor has a direct and substantial
          interest in the subject matter of the litigation and
             13
                Ordinarily, the timeliness of a motion would be an issue of fact for the
          trial court that we would review on appeal under a clearly erroneous stan-
          dard. See Alves v. Giegler, 348 Conn. 364, 385, 306 A.3d 455 (2024). In the
          present case, however, the court made no findings regarding the timing of
          the motion, and no one has raised a claim of untimeliness. The facts sur-
          rounding the timing of the motion, however, are not in dispute. Under these
          unique circumstances, it is appropriate for us to reach a conclusion regarding
          the timeliness of the motion as a matter of law on the basis of the undisputed
          facts in the record, both as to the threshold jurisdictional inquiry and with
          regard to the merits of the motion to intervene.
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