“Legal sufficiency” “means the charge must define substantial conduct clearly
amounting to misfeasance, malfeasance or a violation of the oath of office.” Id.
(citing In re Recall of Anderson, 131 Wn.2d 92, 95, 929 P.2d 410 (1997)). A charge
is legally insufficient if an elected official appropriately exercised the discretion
granted to them by law. Ackerson, 143 Wn.2d at 371 (citing Chandler, 103 Wn.2d
at 274).
If the petition alleges that an official violated the law, the facts must indicate
that the official intended to violate the law. In re Recall of Telford, 166 Wn.2d 148,
158, 206 P.3d 1248 (2009) (citing In re Recall of Carkeek, 156 Wn.2d 469, 128 P.3d
1231 (2006)). “Voters may draw reasonable inferences from the facts alleged; the
fact that reasonable conclusions and inferences have been drawn by the petitioner is
not fatal to the sufficiency of the allegations.” Carkeek, 156 Wn.2d at 473-74 (citing
Chandler, 103 Wn.3d at 274).
We evaluate the sufficiency of a recall petition de novo. In re Recall of
Sawant, 197 Wn.2d 420, 426, 483 P.3d 752 (2021) (citing Teaford v. Howard, 104
11
In re Recall of William O’Neil et al., No.105253-7
Wn.2d 580, 590, 707 P.2d 1327 (1985)). We conduct that review knowing that the
right to recall is guaranteed not just by statute, but by the state constitution. Our role
is limited: we have the duty to verify that the charges are factually and legally
sufficient on the face of the petition. Id. at 427, 425. We do not need to evaluate the
truthfulness of the charges. Id. at 425. In other words, “[i]n recall cases, courts do
not consider the truth of the charges, only the sufficiency.” Inslee, 194 Wn.2d at 567
(citing RCW 29A.56.140; In re Recall of Lindquist, 172 Wn.2d 120, 131-32, 258
P.3d 9 (2011)).