Wash. Supreme Court published opinion — 1052537.pdf

Riddle, Lee, and Hatcher establish that even the threat of retaliation

constitutes a legally sufficient basis for recall. It necessarily follows that actual

retaliation constitutes a legally sufficient basis for recall, also.

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In re Recall of William O’Neil et al., No.105253-7

The commissioners argue that personnel decisions are discretionary and,

hence, cannot form the basis for recall. See Appellant Comm’rs’ Opening Br. at 1

(“The remaining charges as to all three Commissioners are personnel decisions

rightly within the discretionary purview of the Commission . . . .” (citing Bolt, 177

Wn.2d 168)). We reject that argument here, as we did in Hatcher, because retaliation

constitutes a manifest abuse of discretion. 196 Wn.2d at 830 (“[T]he sheriff who

threatens jobs as retaliation and intimidation against those who are witnesses in an

investigation against him manifestly abuses his discretion.”); see also Bolt, 177

Wn.2d at 174 (“‘[D]iscretionary acts of a public official are not a basis for recall

insofar as those acts are an appropriate exercise of discretion by the official in the

performance of his or her duties.’” (quoting Cole, 103 Wn.2d at 283)).

III. The trial court correctly ruled that charge 13, alleging retaliation against
Finance Director Myers, is factually and legally sufficient in all three
petitions

A. Factual sufficiency

Charge 13 of the recall petitions alleges: