Danger Panda, LLC v. Launiu, 10 Cal. App. 5th 502 (2017)

Citation: Danger Panda, LLC v. Launiu, 10 Cal. App. 5th 502 (2017)
Parent Document: Danger Panda, LLC v. Launiu, 10 Cal. App. 5th 502 (2017)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2017-04-04
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4380722/danger-panda-llc-v-launiu/ ↗

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term ―occupant‖ was deliberate and intended to signify something distinct from a party to
the lease is confirmed when the statute is read as a whole.‘ [Citation.]‖ (Drolapas,
supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 653, quoting Mosser Companies, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at
p. 513.)
Defendants mistakenly rely on Mosser Companies and Drolapas. The primary
issue in both of these cases was how to interpret statutory language in the Costa-Hawkins
Act, specifically, the words ―occupant‖ and ―possession‖ in Civil Code section
1954.53(d)(2). (Mosser Companies, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 512-513; Drolapas,
supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at pp. 652-653.) The present case does not involve a proposed
rent increase under the Costa-Hawkins Act.14 Beyond that, the question we address is not
whether David is an occupant or in possession of Unit 308A. The issue here is whether
David‘s status as a minor precludes him from being a ―tenant‖ for all purposes under
section 37.2(t) of the Rent Ordinance. Mosser Companies and Drolapas do not address
this discrete issue. To be sure, the occupants in possession of the rental units in those
case were tenants within the meaning of section 37.2(t) when their respective landlords
attempted to increase their rent, but by that time both were adults. Indeed, as the Mosser
Companies court explicitly stated, after Brian‘s parents ―vacated the apartment and Brian
as an adult, chose to remain in occupancy, he became a tenant obligated to pay rent.‖
(233 Cal.App.4th at p. 516.)
To summarize our conclusions, the general definition of a tenant set forth in
section 37.2(t) of the Rent Ordinance does not embrace a minor child who legally
occupies a rental unit. Rent Ordinance, section 37.9A(e)(3)(A) requires the landlord to
make a relocation payment to ―each tenant,‖ but this part of the Ordinance does not
include a special definition of a tenant that broadens or alters the scope of section 37.2(t),
or any other provision directing a landlord to pay a separate relocation benefit to the child
of a tenant. Taken together, these facts compel us to reverse the judgment in this case.

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