Danger Panda, LLC v. Launiu, 10 Cal. App. 5th 502 (2017)

Citation: Danger Panda, LLC v. Launiu, 10 Cal. App. 5th 502 (2017)
Parent Document: Danger Panda, LLC v. Launiu, 10 Cal. App. 5th 502 (2017)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2017-04-04
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4380722/danger-panda-llc-v-launiu/ ↗

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tenancy approved by the landlord, or by sufferance, to occupy a residential dwelling unit
to the exclusion of others.‖ (Rent Ordinance, § 37.2, subd. (t) (section 37.2(t)), original
boldface.) This definition has remained unchanged since 1980 (Ord. No. 197-80, File
No. 109801.2 (May 5, 1980), p. 4), although its alphabetical subdivision designation has
changed several times.
       The parties disagree about whether David fits within the Rent Ordinance‘s general
definition of a tenant. Construing section 37.2(t) according to its plain language, a tenant
is a person who is entitled to occupy a residential unit (1) to the exclusion of all others
and (2) pursuant to a written agreement; oral agreement; sub tenancy approved by the
landlord; or sufferance.
       The first of these requirements, the right to occupy to the exclusion of others, is a
key characteristic of a leasehold, which distinguishes a tenancy from a mere license.
(Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004,
1040.) Payment of rent is the consideration for this right to exclusive possession.
(Avalon Pacific—Santa Ana, L.P. v. HD Supply Repair & Remodel, LLC (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 1183, 1190 [―A lease is both a conveyance of an estate in real property and a
contract between the lessor and the lessee for the possession and use of the property in
consideration of rent.‖]; see also 12 Witkin Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Real
Property, § 517, p. 593.) Thus, an occupant of a rental unit who does not have the right
to exclusive possession and the concomitant obligation to pay rent does not meet the
generally accepted common law definition of a tenant. Nor does he or she fall within the
section 37.2(t) definition of a tenant quoted above.
       In the present case, the complaint alleged that Unit 308A is occupied pursuant to a
written lease agreement. That agreement, which was incorporated into the complaint,
was executed between plaintiff‘s predecessor in interest and Nancy and her husband.
Therefore, Nancy is a tenant under section 37.2(t). Furthermore, by alleging that Donn
and Olga are also tenants of Unit 308A, plaintiff appears to have conceded that these
defendants acquired an independent right to occupy the premises to the exclusion of
others, pursuant to either a written lease, oral contract, sub tenancy or suffrage.

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