Danger Panda, LLC v. Launiu, 10 Cal. App. 5th 502 (2017)

Citation: Danger Panda, LLC v. Launiu, 10 Cal. App. 5th 502 (2017)
Parent Document: Danger Panda, LLC v. Launiu, 10 Cal. App. 5th 502 (2017)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2017-04-04
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4380722/danger-panda-llc-v-launiu/ ↗

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occupancy,‖ and that ―Brian‘s rights ha[d] concomitant obligations.‖ (Id. at p. 516.) As
the court explained, ―[w]hen Brian‘s parents vacated the apartment and Brian, as an adult,
chose to remain in occupancy, he became a tenant obligated to pay rent. Tenancies in
property need not be created by written leases. [Citation.] One may become a tenant by
occupancy with consent. [Citation.] ‗ ―Such tenancies carry with them the relationship
of landlord and tenant. The tenant is liable by operation of law.‖ [Citations.]‘
[Citation.]‖ (Ibid.)
Drolapas, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th 646, was another case addressing whether a rent
increase was authorized by Civil Code section 1954.53(d)(2) of the Costa-Hawkins Act.
In 1995, Mr. and Mrs. Lara executed a written rental agreement and moved into the
apartment with their children, including six-year-old Borjas. In 2000, appellant
purchased the apartment building and the Lara parents signed a statement identifying
themselves as the tenants, but also stating that the unit was occupied by two adults and
four children, which was the number of ―allowable tenants.‖ (Id. at p. 649.) In 2010, the
Lara parents bought a home they began to use as their primary residence, but they
continued to pay rent on the apartment. Meanwhile, Borjas continuously lived in the
apartment and paid rent to his parents when he was able. (Ibid.)
Applying Mosser Companies, this court first concluded that ―Borjas was an
‗original occupant‘ within the meaning of section 1954.53, subdivision (d)(2)‖ when he
moved into the apartment as a six-year-old child. (Drolapas, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 652-653.) Second, we concluded that Borjas ―took possession‖ of the apartment
pursuant to the rental agreement even though he was a minor at the time. As support for
this conclusion, we relied on the following reasoning in Mosser Companies:
― ‗ ―Possession‖ is a commonly understood term normally referring to physical
possession. . . . [L]imiting the term to parties to a legal agreement is inconsistent both
with this common understanding and with the terms used in the statute. The statute refers
to an ―occupant‖ rather than a ―tenant,‖ ―lessee,‖ or ―party.‖ These terms have distinct
and well-established meanings, making it unlikely the Legislature used the term
―occupant‖ when it meant party to a rental agreement. That the Legislature‘s use of the

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