Danger Panda, LLC v. Launiu, 10 Cal. App. 5th 502 (2017)

Citation: Danger Panda, LLC v. Launiu, 10 Cal. App. 5th 502 (2017)
Parent Document: Danger Panda, LLC v. Launiu, 10 Cal. App. 5th 502 (2017)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2017-04-04
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4380722/danger-panda-llc-v-launiu/ ↗

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sometimes to limit the scope of the benefit and other times to expand it. There are clear
indications of a legislative goal to assist not just the displaced tenant, but the tenant‘s
family or household. For example, the December 1999 amendment increased the amount
of the relocation payments in recognition that tenants evicted under the Ellis Act are
―forced to incur substantial costs to relocate themselves and their families to new housing
. . . .‖ (Ord. No. 5-00, File No. 992236 (Dec. 20, 1999), p. 9, italics added.) However,
we find no evidence of an intent to require a landlord to parse a relocation payment
among individual members of such a household or to make a separate payment to a
tenant‘s minor child. Thus, the history of section 37.9A is indicative of a legislative
determination not to expand the scope of eligible recipients of an Ellis Act relocation
benefit under section 37.9A beyond those tenants who fit the traditional common law
definition of that term.
Furthermore, because section 37.9A does not contain a special definition of a
tenant who is entitled to an Ellis Act relocation benefit, in order to qualify for that
benefit, the occupant must be a tenant as defined in section 37.2(t), the more general
section of the Rent Ordinance, which essentially means that he or she must be a tenant for
all purposes for which the term tenant is employed throughout the Rent Ordinance.
Characterizing a minor like David as a tenant for all purposes could lead to absurd results
because the Rent Ordinance confers benefits and obligations on a tenant that should not
and sometimes cannot be assumed by a child, not the least of which is the obligation to
pay rent.
C. Case Law
Defendants contend that the common law ―is not determinative of this appeal,
because the Rent Ordinance has specifically defined those who are tenants under the
Ordinance in Section 37.2(t).‖ But defendants ignore language in section 37.2(t) that, as
discussed above, is consistent with the traditional definition of a tenant.
Instead, defendants maintain that California courts have ―repeatedly‖ interpreted
the Rent Ordinance definition of a tenant to include ―all lawful occupants of a dwelling.‖
The cases defendants cite fall into two general categories, one addressing lawful

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