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estate” or interest in the land. (Jenson v. Kenneth I. Mullen Inc. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 653,
657.) The authorization to perform certain acts without conferring any interest in the land is
considered “a personal privilege.” (Ibid.) A license is normally revocable at will. (Golden
West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 11, 36.) Whether the terminated
resident manager is classified as a tenant at sufferance or a licensee, the law is clear that under
either classification, the terminated employee is not considered a tenant. (Chan, supra, 203
Cal.App.3d at p. Supp. 25 [a terminated employee who entered the land as a licensee “could not
convert his status into that of a tenant by refusing to vacate upon expiration of his
employment”].)
Thus, while the TPA includes in its list of scenarios that constitute “at fault-just cause”
eviction situations where a lawful tenant may have at one time been “an employee, agent, or a
licensee” who failed to vacate after they were terminated as an employee, agent, or licensee, the
mere contemplation or existence of these scenarios does not serve to unilaterally transmute the
status of a terminated resident manager into that of a lawful tenant where the resident
manager’s initial occupation of the property was premised solely upon employment. (See
Chan, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. Supp. 25 [terminated employee “could not convert his status
into that of a tenant by refusing to vacate upon expiration of his employment”].) Caselaw
dictates that such an individual is either a tenant at sufferance or licensee who enjoys no tenant
protections, including notice. (See Id. at pp. Supp. 25-26; Karz v. Mecham, supra, at p. Supp.
4.) And unless, and until, some action is taken by the parties that reflects their mutual assent to
change the nature of the agreement between the two of them, such an individual remains so
classified. (See Borden v. Stiles, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 349.)
Defendants contend that they “continuously and lawfully occupied” the premises from
December 2020 until the 30-day notice was served and expired on August 13, 2024.
Defendants seem to take the position that because they refused to vacate the premises after
service of the employment termination letter and 30-day notice of termination of tenancy on
August 10, 2023 and purported to make rent payments thereafter, Rosales’s status as an
employee-occupant was somehow transformed into a tenancy entitling her to all of the rights
and protections afforded under the TPA. We disagree.