Skip to main content
DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

De Paolo v. Rosales (2026)

Citation
De Paolo v. Rosales (2026)
Parent Document
De Paolo v. Rosales (2026)
Jurisdiction
California (state)
Effective Date
2026-01-27

Full Text

2,332 chars
11
consider extrinsic sources such as legislative history . . . ’ [Citation.] ‘“In cases of uncertain
meaning, we may also consider the consequences of a particular interpretation, including its
impact on public policy.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Borden v. Stiles, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 345-346.)
           Analysis
           On the complaint, plaintiff indicated that the tenancy was subject to the TPA and that
the tenancy was terminated for at-fault just cause pursuant to section 1946.2, subdivision (b)(1).
Defendants contend that plaintiff’s concession to the applicability of the TPA as reflected on
the complaint, coupled with plaintiff’s failure to include the language required by the relevant
portion of the TPA (Civ. Code § 1946.2, subd. (f)), which defendants refer to as the California
law notice, “as an addendum to the lease or rental agreement, or as a written notice signed by
the tenant” render plaintiff’s written termination notice void. We disagree.
           The ultimate question before us is whether a terminated resident manager’s continued
occupancy of a premises belonging to her employer, that she was only permitted to occupy as
part of her employment compensation, qualifies as a tenancy for the purposes of the TPA. We
conclude it does not. In order to qualify as a tenancy within the meaning of the TPA, the
occupant’s occupation of the premises must be lawful. (Civ. Code § 1946.2, subd. (k)(3).)
After Rosales was terminated from her position as resident manager, and the 30-day period
established in the resident manager’s agreement elapsed, her occupancy of the premises became
unlawful. (See Karz v. Mecham, supra, at p. Supp. 4.)
       The case law is clear, a terminated resident manager who refuses to vacate becomes
either a tenant at sufferance or a licensee.3 (See Karz v. Mecham, supra, at p. Supp. 4 [tenant at
sufferance]; Chan, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at pp. Supp. 24-25 [licensee].) A tenant at
sufferance is a person who lawfully entered into possession of a property but continues to
occupy it without any legal title or the landlord’s consent after the termination of the tenancy.
(Roxbury Lane LP v. Harris (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th Supp. 9, 15.) A “licensee is a person or
entity authorized to do a particular act or acts on the property of another without possessing any