9
she was entitled to occupancy after her termination. As it is settled that a person who occupies
premises belonging to her employer as part of her compensation has no right to continue in
possession upon termination of her employment (Karz v. Mecham, supra, at p. Supp. 4), and
given that Rosales signed an agreement stating she would vacate the premises upon termination
of her employment, and then failed to do so, plaintiff’s right to initiate unlawful detainer
proceedings against defendants was triggered. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161, subd. (1); Chan,
supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at pp. Supp. 24-25.) Here, as the terms of the resident manager’s
agreement were unambiguous, “definite and certain” as to Rosales’s obligation to vacate the
premises in the event of her termination, we need not look to or consider defendants’ post-
termination conduct to determine the intent of the parties when entering into the agreement.
(Freeman v. Arnke (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 509, 514 [“‘If the contract is definite and certain it is
neither necessary nor proper to rely upon the conduct of the parties for its construction’” or to
“‘discover[] the all[-]important element of intent of the parties to the contract’”].)
Charlemagne testified that he never signed any type of lease agreement, and Rosales
testified that Charlemagne only moved into the premises with her after she had been there as
the resident manager. By entering into the manager’s agreement, Rosales agreed that upon her
termination from employment as resident manager, Rosales along with any additional
occupants would be required to vacate the premises. Both defendants admitted that in listing
one another as additional occupants on their respective rental applications, they both separately
indicated that they were one another’s spouses, but that in fact they were not married. This
evidence establishes that Charlemagne was only able to occupy the property as an additional
occupant or guest of Rosales. He had no independent right as a tenant to possess or occupy the
premises.
Applicability of the Tenant Protection Act
Defendants contend that because there was “no evidence, substantial or otherwise, that
[the] ‘California law notice’ was provided as an addendum to the lease or rental agreement or
as a written notice signed by the tenant,” the TPA was violated thereby rendering the 30-day
notice void. As we have found no published opinion addressing whether individuals occupying
a property that is subject to the TPA pursuant to a resident manager’s agreement are considered