Section 1942
- Citation
- Section 1942
- Parent Document
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Jurisdiction
- California (state)
- Effective Date
- 1970-11-10
Other Sections in This Document (98)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (1970)
- Section 1941
- Section 1942
- Section 1942
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- Section 1941
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Full Text
1,533 charsWhile District of Columbia circuit opinions are not controlling precedent in this court, the compulsion of persuasive reasoning is not circumscribed by jurisdictional boundaries. The Edwards court was faced with the problem of reconciling the apparently unlimited power of landlords to evict with the fundamental public policy underlying the housing and sanitation codes. The court held that landlords could not exercise their rights under the eviction statutes to retaliate against tenants invoking their rights under the housing and sanitation codes. Except for superficial distinctions our problem is identical. If we fail to recognize a reasonable limitation on the punitive power of landlords to increase rents and evict tenants, the salutary purposes sought to be achieved by the Legislature in enacting Civil Code sections 1941 and 1942 will be frustrated. If we deny tenants a defense against retaliatory eviction in unlawful detainer actions, we lend the exercise of the judicial process to aid landlords in punishing those tenants with the audacity to exercise their statutory rights. Thus sound statutory construction here, as Edwards held in comparable circumstances, requires that we reconcile sections 1942 and 1161 by recognizing existence of a defense in unlawful detainer actions when the landlord's motive is retaliation for the exercise of statutory rights under section 1942. Adoption of the alternative course would suggest a devious legislative intent to render section 1942 ineffective as a protective measure.