10
recover possession” in retaliation for respondents’ exercise of
their rights.
The litigation privilege is here inapplicable. It does not bar
an action against a landlord for violating Civil Code section
1942.5, subdivision (d). As to such actions, the legislature
created an exception to the litigation privilege. (See Banuelos v.
LA Investment, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 323, 332 [“If the
litigation privilege trumped a suit for retaliatory eviction
under section 1942.5 the privilege would ‘“effectively immunize
conduct that the [statute] prohibits”’ [citation] thereby
encouraging, rather than suppressing, ‘“the mischief at which it
was directed . . .”’”]; Winslett v. 1811 27th Avenue, LLC (2018) 26
Cal.App.5th 239, 255 [“To be consistent with the high court's
guidance that we give section 1942.5 a liberal construction
designed to achieve the legislative purpose, we conclude that the
litigation privilege must yield to it”]; Id. at p. 254 [“we agree with
. . . Banuelos . . . that section 1942.5, subdivisions (d) and (h) . . .
create an exception to the litigation privilege”]; Action Apartment
Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1247
[“the Legislature remains free to create exceptions to the
litigation privilege”].)
Award of Attorney Fees as Sanction
For making a frivolous anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court
sanctioned appellants by awarding respondents their reasonable
attorney fees of $8,750. “If the court finds that a special motion
to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary
delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees
to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to Section
128.5.” (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) “Frivolous in this context means
that any reasonable attorney would agree the motion was totally