9
be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Baral, supra, at p.
394; see also Bonni, supra, at p. 1012 [“we may consider whether
Bonni’s various allegations supply the elements of a retaliation
claim or merely provide context”].)
The only viable cause of action for unlawful retaliation is
the alleged violation of Civil Code section 1942.5, subdivision (d).
Respondents did not allege, and could not have meritoriously
alleged, that appellants had violated this statute by filing the
malicious prosecution action. Respondents alleged that
appellants had “violated Civil Code section 1942.5(d) by
decreasing services, increasing rent, causing [respondents] to quit
involuntarily by interfering with their peaceable enjoyment of
their home and leasehold, bringing an action to recover
possession, and/or by threatening to do these acts in retaliation
for [respondents’] peaceful and lawful exercise of their legal
rights under the law.”
The trial court therefore did not err in denying appellants’
anti-SLAPP motion even though their filing of the malicious
prosecution action and subsequent settlement negotiations were
protected activity.
The Litigation Privilege is Inapplicable
Appellants assert, “A cause of action brought under Civil
Code section 1942.5 for alleged retaliation is properly stricken as
a SLAPP suit when the conduct complained of is protected by the
litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47.” Appellants
contend that the litigation privilege protects them from liability
for a violation of section 1942.5 based on the conduct complained
of in the eleventh cause of action. In theory, the litigation
privilege may apply to the cause of action’s claim that appellants
violated section 1942.5, subdivision (d) by “bringing an action to