5
statute. (See Area 55, LLC v. Nicholas & Tomasevic, LLP (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 136, 151 [“‘“‘every claim of malicious prosecution
is a cause of action arising from protected activity . . .’”’”].)
Nevertheless, it denied the motion to strike because the eleventh
“cause of action . . . [did] not arise from the malicious prosecution
action.” Instead, it arose from the alleged violation of Civil Code
section 1942.5, subdivision (d), and “[t]he filing of a malicious
prosecution action is not conduct that leads to liability under
Civil Code section 1942.5.” Thus, appellants failed to satisfy
their “first-step burden” of demonstrating that the “challenged
claim rests on . . . activity [that] is protected by the anti-
SLAPP statute.” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.)
The trial court reasoned: “[T]he conduct that leads to
liability [under Civil Code section 1942.5, subdivision (d)] is
actual or threatened increases in rent or decreases in services;
conduct that cause[s] a lessee to quit involuntarily; or bringing an
action to recover possession.” “While the existence of the
malicious prosecution action will undoubtedly provide
evidentiary support for the claim [of unlawful retaliation in
violation of Civil Code section 1942.5, subdivision (d)] . . . , an
anti-SLAPP motion should be granted only if liability is based on
speech or petitioning activity itself.” “[N]either the malicious
prosecution [action] nor the settlement discussions are liability
producing activities under the [eleventh] cause of action.”
Standard of Review
“A ruling on a section 425.16 motion is reviewed de novo.
[Citation.] We review the record independently to determine
whether the asserted cause of action arises from activity
protected under the statute . . . .” (Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC
(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 664, 675.)