This case illustrates the principle that an anti-SLAPP
motion lies only as to “allegations of protected activity that are
asserted as grounds for relief.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th
376, 395 (Baral).) Here, the targeted cause of action mentions
protected activity – the filing of a malicious prosecution action –
but this activity is not asserted as a ground for relief. The
grounds for relief are based on the violation of a statute – Civil
Code section 1942.5, subdivision (d). The trial court properly
denied appellants’ anti-SLAPP motion and did not abuse its
discretion in imposing sanctions for making a frivolous motion.
Appellant Waterhouse Management Corp. is the property
manager of Nomad Village Mobile Home Park (the Park), a 150-
space mobile home park in Santa Barbara. Appellant Lazy
Landing MHP, LLC, owns the long-term ground lease for the
Park. Respondents are current and former lessees of mobile
homes in the Park. They initially sued appellants for violations
of the Mobilehome Residency Law (Civ. Code, § 798 et seq.) and
the Mobilehome Parks Act (Health & Saf. Code, § 18200 et seq.),
alleging failure to properly maintain the Park. While
respondents’ lawsuit (the original lawsuit) was pending,
appellants filed a malicious prosecution action against
respondents. (See post at pp. 4-5 and fn. 2.)
After the filing of appellants’ malicious prosecution action,
respondents amended their complaint in the original lawsuit to
add an eleventh cause of action for unlawful retaliation in
violation of Civil Code section 1942.5, subdivision (d). This cause
of action alleged appellants had committed various acts in
retaliation for respondents’ participation in the original lawsuit
and the exercise of their rights as lessees.
One of the mentioned acts was appellants’ filing of the
malicious prosecution action. Seizing on this reference to
protected activity, appellants filed a special motion to strike
respondents’ entire eleventh cause of action as a SLAPP
(Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation). (Code Civ.
Proc., § 425.16.)1 Appellants contended the cause of action arose
out of respondents’ allegations concerning the malicious
prosecution action. As we will explain, these allegations “merely
provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery . . . .”
(Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394.) Respondents’ claim for
recovery arises out of their allegations of retaliation in violation