2
of Civil Code section 1942.5, subdivision (d), which does not apply
to a lessor’s retaliatory malicious prosecution action against a
lessee. Accordingly, we affirm.
The Anti-SLAPP Statute
“A court evaluates an anti-SLAPP motion in two steps. . . .
[¶] . . . The defendant’s first-step burden is to identify the activity
each challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity
is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Wilson v. Cable News
Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884 (Wilson).) “A defendant
satisfies the first step of the analysis by demonstrating that the
‘conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls
within one of the four categories described in subdivision (e)
[of section 425.16]’ [citation], and that the plaintiff's claims in
fact arise from that conduct [citation]. The four categories in
subdivision (e) describe conduct ‘“in furtherance of a person’s
right of petition or free speech under the United States or
California Constitution in connection with a public issue.”’ (§
425.16, subd. (e).)” (Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 619-620.) “At this stage, the question is
only whether a defendant has made out a prima facie case that
activity underlying a plaintiff's claims is statutorily
protected . . . .” (Wilson, supra, at p. 888.)
This is a “first-step” case. Because appellants failed to
carry their first-step burden, we do not reach the second step.
The Eleventh Cause of Action
“‘As is true with summary judgment motions, the issues in
an anti-SLAPP motion are framed by the pleadings.’ [Citations.]
Thus, the act or acts underlying a claim for purposes of an anti-
SLAPP statute is determined from the plaintiffs’ allegations.”