Section 1437d

Citation: Section 1437d
Parent Document: Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113 (2001)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2001-01-24
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7086389/rucker-v-davis/ ↗

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The canons of statutory interpretation provide: “[Wjhere Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (6th Cir.1972)). Congress clearly perceived that forfeitures of leaseholds under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) were to function differently from evictions under 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(Z )(6) and legislated different regimes to govern the two. Specifically, Congress recognized that the forfeiture statute permitted the government to seize property without providing any procedural protections to the owner of the property. 134 Cong. Rec. E1965-02 (1988) (use of seizure rather than eviction “eut[s] through the usual drawn-out process of first notifying the drug dealers that they would be evicted and then battling them in courts, sometimes for years, before they could be removed.”) Owing to the lack of procedural protections, Congress recognized that additional substantive protec*1133tions are needed to prevent the use of this weapon against undeserving parties.

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