A Society Without a Name v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 655 F.3d 342 (2011)

Citation: A Society Without a Name v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 655 F.3d 342 (2011)
Parent Document: A Society Without a Name v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 655 F.3d 342 (2011)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2011-08-24
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/612506/a-society-without-a-name-v-commo... ↗

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The majority opinion correctly observes that ASWAN’s
FHA, equal protection and § 1983 claims are subject to a two-
year limitations period, and its ADA claims are subject to a
one-year statute of limitations. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a) (FHA);
Al-Amin v. Shear, 325 F. App’x 190, 193 (4th Cir. 2009)
(unpublished) (equal protection and § 1983 claims); Wolsky v.
Med. Coll. of Hampton Roads, 1 F.3d 222, 223 (4th Cir.
1993) (ADA). When considering whether a continuing viola-
tion is alleged, however, "The Supreme Court has ‘stressed
  1
   For convenience, I hereafter refer to this particular conclusion as "the
majority opinion."
              A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA                        21
the need to identify with care the specific [discriminatory]
practice that is at issue.’" Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456,
462 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 624 (2007)); see also
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982)
(focusing on "the continuing nature of the alleged violation");
Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1168 (4th
Cir. 1991) (examining the "nature of the wrongful conduct
and harm alleged") (quotation marks omitted). Here, ASWAN
alleges at length in its ninety-five-page Second Amended
Complaint that the defendants have engaged, since at least the
early 1990s, in a series of calculated and discriminatory acts
designed to isolate homeless persons from Richmond’s down-
town, mainstream community.2 ASWAN alleges that the
  2
    I give here only a brief summary of the exhaustive and detailed allega-
tions of historical facts (many of which are substantiated by documents in
the Joint Appendix) leading to the recent isolation efforts that are the gra-
vamen of the Second Amended Complaint. ASWAN alleges that through
most of the ‘80s and ‘90s, the Daily Planet provided overnight shelter,
daytime residency, meals, and employment assistance services to Rich-
mond’s homeless population at the Street Center, which was located on
West Canal Street downtown. ASWAN further alleges that: In 1993, the
City of Richmond sold the West Canal Street location and promised to
assist in finding a new site for the Street Center. The Daily Planet settled
on a site on West Grace Street "in Richmond’s mainstream near VCU’s
campus." Despite a substantial grant from the United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development to purchase and develop the West
Grace Street site, the Daily Planet did not pursue the site because VCU
and the City threatened to curtail financial support. VCU and the City con-
certedly dissuaded the Daily Planet from pursuing other locations, includ-
ing the City’s restrictive zoning ordinances, which became the subject of
a 1997 lawsuit. VCU and the City persistently urged the Daily Planet to
relocate its services for the homeless on 17th Street (later renamed Oliver
Hill Way). In 1997, the City adopted the Downtown Plan, which stated a
policy of relocating services for homeless and other defined "street per-
sons" away from downtown. Because of the Daily Planet’s unwillingness
to accept the Oliver Hill Way location, the defendants allegedly proposi-
tioned Freedom House, another provider of homeless services in Rich-
mond. Freedom House accepted the proposal, leased the Oliver Hill Way
site from VCU, obtained from the City a special use permit to build a
homeless shelter, and opened the doors of the Conrad Center on February
5, 2007.
22          A SOCIETY WITHOUT A NAME v. VIRGINIA
defendants have only recently achieved this discriminatory
isolation, essentially by two means: first, by the siting and
construction of the Conrad Center in an allegedly remote
location; and second, by the piecemeal relocation of services
for homeless persons from the downtown community to the
Conrad Center. See, e.g., Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City
of St. Paul, Minn., 923 F.2d 91, 93-94 (8th Cir. 1991)
(upholding city ordinance tending to integrate and refusing to
"agree that Congress intended the Fair Housing Amendment
Act of 1988 to contribute to the segregation of the mentally
ill from the mainstream of our society"); see also Human Res.
Research & Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 687 F. Supp.
2d 237, 253-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Bryant Woods Inn,
Inc. v. Howard Cnty., Md., 911 F. Supp. 918, 946 (D. Md.
1996)).

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