section 100

Citation: section 100
Parent Document: Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Authority, 161 F.3d 1290 (1998)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 1998-12-02
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/73387/gonzalez-v-lee-county-housing-authority/ ↗

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  See also W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 500-01 (3d Cir. 1995) (examining
regulations to determine parameters of clearly established law); Torcasio
v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1350-52 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that
administrative guidelines “may provide some evidence that it is . . .
established that the ADA applies to state prisons”); Doe by and through
Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1995)
(“[A]n obligation to act might arise from something other than decisional
law, such as a regulation or policy that an official is legally bound to
follow.”).
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   This holding is consistent with the principle that individuals
presumptively have notice of their legal duties under federal
regulations. See, e.g., Heckler v. Community Health Servs. of Crawford
County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 65-66, 104 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (1984) (“[T]he
regulations governing the cost reimbursement provisions of Medicare
should and did put respondent on ample notice of the care with which its
cost reports must be prepared . . . .”); Ed Taylor Constr. Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 938 F.2d 1265, 1272 (11th

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