Skip to main content
DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

section 3617

Citation
section 3617
Parent Document
Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Authority, 161 F.3d 1290 (1998)
Effective Date
1998-12-02

Other Sections in This Document (884)

Full Text

2,008 chars
immunity is compatible with the policy goals of § 1983, see id. at 266-
71, 101 S. Ct. at 2759-62.
31
  The fact that § 3617 is silent as to qualified immunity indicates that
Congress did not intend to preclude the common-law qualified immunity
defense in § 3617 actions. Cf. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,
268, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2613 (1993) (“Certain immunities were so well
established in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted, that we presume that
Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish
them.”) (internal quotation omitted); Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 258, 101
S. Ct. at 2755 (“One important assumption underlying the Court’s
decisions in this area is that members of the 42d Congress were familiar
with common-law principles, including defenses previously recognized in
ordinary tort litigation, and that they likely intended these common-law
principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary.”).
32
  The substance of § 3617: (1) appeared in the amendment to H.R. 2516
that was introduced and later tabled by Senators Mondale and Brooks, see
114 Cong. Rec. at 2270; (2) was included in Senator Dirksen’s approved
substitute amendment to H.R. 2516, see 114 Cong. Rec. at 4573; and (3)
was part of the bills passed by the Senate, see id. at 5992, and the
House of Representatives, see id. at 9621; see also Pub. L. 90-284, Title
VIII, § 817, 82 Stat. 89 (1968). No aspect of the legislative history
suggests that Congress intended to deprive public officials of the
ability to assert a qualified immunity defense in a § 3617 action. See,
e.g., S. Rep. No. 721 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837
(concerning relevant public law, but not addressing § 3617).
33
  See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2736
(1982) (stating that qualified immunity is necessary to avoid “the
expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing
public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of
public office”).