section 100

Citation: section 100
Parent Document: Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Authority, 161 F.3d 1290 (1998)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 1998-12-02
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/73387/gonzalez-v-lee-county-housing-authority/ ↗

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   Although Gonzalez herself did not cite § 100.400(c)(3) before the
district court or initially on appeal, we must evaluate the clearly
defined scope of § 3617 sua sponte, regardless of whether the
implementing regulation was proffered as relevant legal authority. In
Elder v. Holloway, 975 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d, 510 U.S. 510,
114 S. Ct. 1019 (1994), the plaintiff in a § 1983 action appealed the
district court’s determination that the defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity. The plaintiff failed to inform either the district
court or the Ninth Circuit of factually similar pre-existing case law
that indicated the illegality of the defendants’ actions. See id. at
1390.   Although the Ninth Circuit noticed that a pre-existing case
appeared to proscribe defendants’ actions, see id. at 1391, the court
held that a plaintiff may not benefit on appeal from precedent that
neither he nor the district court cited.      See id. at 1394-96.    The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that an appellate court is required to
determine the clearly established law sua sponte, based on “its ‘full
knowledge of its own [and other relevant] precedents,’” 510 U.S. at 516,
114 S. Ct. at 1023 (citing Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 192 n.9, 104
S. Ct. 3012, 3018 n.9 (1984)) (brackets in Elder). Accordingly, we must
determine the clearly established contours of § 3617 sua sponte.

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