Lena Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation, 463 F.2d 853 (1972)

Citation: Lena Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation, 463 F.2d 853 (1972)
Parent Document: Lena Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation, 463 F.2d 853 (1972)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 1972-04-03
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/304588/lena-robinson-v-diamond-housing-... ↗

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It should be plain from the above discussion that the landlord's assertion that he wishes to remove the property from the market, even when coupled with the assertion that he is unwilling to remedy housing code violations, is legally insufficient to justify summary judgment over a Southall Realty defense. Indeed, the offer to take the unit off the market is totally irrelevant to the issue of motive unless it is accompanied by the further declaration that the landlord is unable to correct housing code violations which preclude his receipt of rent. But while inability to repair is a legitimate business reason which would justify removing the unit from the market, even this allegation is not sufficient to justify summary judgment. We should remember that summary judgment "is not a catch penny contrivance to take unwary litigants into its toils and deprive them of a trial, it is a liberal measure, liberally designed for arriving at the truth. Its purpose is not to cut litigants off from their right of trial by jury if they really have evidence which they will offer on trial, it is to carefully test this out, in advance of trial by inquiring and determining whether such evidence exists." Whitaker v. Coleman, 5 Cir., 115 F.2d 305, 307 (1940).

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