Lena Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation, 463 F.2d 853 (1972)

Citation: Lena Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation, 463 F.2d 853 (1972)
Parent Document: Lena Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation, 463 F.2d 853 (1972)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 1972-04-03
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/304588/lena-robinson-v-diamond-housing-... ↗

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Unwilling to admit defeat, Diamond Housing instituted a second suit for possession on the theory that, since the lease was void, Mrs. Robinson was a trespasser and hence no longer entitled to possession. When the trial court granted Mrs. Robinson's motion to dismiss,6 Diamond Housing appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. That court affirmed, holding that "an agreement entered into in violation of the law creates no rights upon the wrongdoer. The defense of illegality does not rescind the illegal agreement, but merely prevents a party from using the courts to enforce such an agreement." Diamond Housing Corp. v. Robinson, D.C.App., 257 A.2d 492, 495 (1969). (Footnote omitted.) It followed that Mrs. Robinson, "having entered possession under a void and unenforceable lease, was not a trespasser but became a tenant at sufferance." Ibid. The court added, however, that Mrs. Robinson's tenancy, "like any other tenancy at sufferance, may be terminated on thirty days' notice. The Housing Regulations do not compel an owner of housing property to rent his property. Where, as here, it has been determined that the property when rented was not habitable, that is, not safe and sanitary, and should not have been rented, and if the landlord is unwilling or unable to put the property in a habitable condition, he may and should promptly terminate the tenancy and withdraw the property from the rental market, because the Regulations forbid both the rental and the occupancy of such premises." Ibid. (Footnote omitted.)

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