Lena Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation, 463 F.2d 853 (1972)

Citation: Lena Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation, 463 F.2d 853 (1972)
Parent Document: Lena Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation, 463 F.2d 853 (1972)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 1972-04-03
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/304588/lena-robinson-v-diamond-housing-... ↗

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sufficient in this situation. Although the broad principles which underlie Edwards would seem squarely applicable, it is possible that something special about this fact pattern would make it unwise or impermissible to utilize Edwards here. Diamond Housing takes the position that this case is, in fact, speciál and that the special circumstances surrounding it make an application of Edwards unjust. Diamond’s argument begins with the premise — apparently shared by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals11 — that Edwards should be narrowly “limited to its facts.” Since Edwards involved reporting of code violations to city officials while this case involves setting up those violations as a defense to an action for eviction, it is contended that Edwards does not compel reversal here. Moreover, Diamond argues that, even if Edwards is more broadly read, it still should not be applied to a case such as this where the landlord is prevented from collecting rent by Southall Realty, refuses to repair the premises, and wishes to take the housing off the market altogether. Closely allied to this contention is the further argument that Mrs. Robinson is precluded from remaining in possession by Section 2301 of the Housing Regulations which makes it illegal to occupy premises which are in violation of the Regulations. Finally, Diamond argues that in any event this case is now moot since Mrs. Robinson has voluntarily surrendered possession and Diamond has chosen to forego any claim it might have to back rent.

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