Lena Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation, 463 F.2d 853 (1972)

Citation: Lena Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation, 463 F.2d 853 (1972)
Parent Document: Lena Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation, 463 F.2d 853 (1972)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 1972-04-03
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/304588/lena-robinson-v-diamond-housing-... ↗

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We can find nothing about the Edwards principle which necessitates such a drastic limitation on its applicability. Indeed the prohibition against retaliatory evictions generally, without limitation to the facts of Edwards, and in terms applicable to Southall Realty rights,1 has become part of the housing code of the District of Columbia. We see no reason why the rights protected in Southall Realty and Javins should be rendered nugatory by a restrictive reading of Edwards or by a judicial failure to respect the legislative will. We are therefore of the view that appellant should have been given the opportunity to prove the facts necessary to make out an Edwards defense and that the trial judge erred in aborting this opportunity by prematurely granting summary judgment. It follows that the decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals must be reversed. 6
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