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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582 (2022)

Citation
Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582 (2022)
Parent Document
Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582 (2022)
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (state)
Effective Date
2022-03-29

Other Sections in This Document (164)

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that the defendant engaged in bad faith litigation con-
           duct, the plaintiff would be required to establish that
           the defendant used litigation procedures, such as filing
           baseless special defenses or false discovery responses,
           for the improper purposes alleged in her complaint,
           namely, ‘‘forc[ing] [the plaintiff] to undergo an unneces-
           sarily time consuming and expensive course of litigation
           to obtain what was legally due to [her]’’ and ‘‘frustrat-
           [ing] [her] ability to receive benefits due [to her] under
           her contract.’’
              The majority also argues that, ‘‘[i]f [this concurring
           and dissenting opinion] were correct that the plaintiff’s
           factual allegations were sufficient . . . to challenge
           the defendant’s use of the courts, any plaintiff could
           pierce the litigation privilege with any cause of action by
           merely including allegations that a defendant’s conduct
           constituted an abuse of the judicial system.’’ Part II A of
           the majority opinion. Not at all. First, I have repeatedly
           stressed in this opinion that my conclusions are driven
           largely by the special considerations that arise from the
           relationship between an insurance company and a first-
           party insured, considerations that are embedded in the
           common-law bad faith doctrine, including the asymme-
           try between the insured and the insurer with respect
           to bargaining power and litigation experience and the
           special vulnerabilities of an insured who has suffered
           a covered loss. See part II A of this opinion; see also
           part III B of this opinion (discussing similar considera-
           tions in connection with CUIPA and CUTPA). Second,
           some ‘‘improper purposes,’’ such as the intent to
           defraud or defame, have been found not to constitute
           abuse of process as a matter of law for purposes of the
           litigation privilege; an allegation that the defendant’s
           fraud or defamation constituted abuse of process could
           not survive a motion to dismiss. But, if a party can
           allege facts showing that a defendant has abused judi-
           cial procedures for a purpose that has been recognized
March 29, 2022                CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                    Page 107