Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582 (2022)

Citation: Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582 (2022)
Parent Document: Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582 (2022)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2022-03-29
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278647/dorfman-v-smith/ ↗

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Emergency Fleet Corp., 53 F.2d 359, 361 (2d Cir. 1931)
         (‘‘the elements vital to an action for abuse of process
         are not clearly defined, either by the cases or by writers
         on the subject’’); Mozzochi v. Beck, supra, 204 Conn.
         496 (‘‘[c]ourts have struggled to determine under what
         circumstances . . . a complaint states a cause of
         action for abuse of process’’); Board of Education of
         Farmingdale Union Free School District v. Farming-
         dale Classroom Teachers Assn., Inc., Local 1889, AFT
         AFL-CIO, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 400, 343 N.E.2d 278, 380
         N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975) (‘‘this tort is an obscure one . . .
         one which is rarely brought to the attention of the courts
         . . . and the vital elements of which are not clearly
         defined’’ (citations omitted)). There appears to be gen-
         eral agreement, however, that ‘‘[t]he improper purpose
         usually takes the form of coercion to obtain a collateral
         advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding
         itself, such as the surrender of property or the payment
         of money, by the use of the process as a threat or a
         fraudulent.’’); W. Barker et al., ‘‘Litigating About Litigation: Can Insurers Be
         Liable for Too Vigorously Defending Their Insureds?,’’ 42 Tort Trial & Ins.
         Prac. L.J. 827, 854 (2007) (‘‘[t]he cases almost uniformly reject plaintiffs’
         attempts to impose liability based on allegedly frivolous defenses, suppos-
         edly asserted only to delay an inevitable recovery’’); cf. Dean v. Kirkland,
         301 Ill. App. 495, 509–10, 23 N.E.2d 180 (1939) (filing of false pleadings,
         falseness of which would be determined during course of underlying pro-
         ceeding, was not abuse of process). But see Aranson v. Schroeder, 140 N.H.
         359, 366–67, 671 A.2d 1023 (1995) (adopting tort of malicious defense if
         defendant raises defense without probable cause for purpose of harassing
         opponent or delaying litigation, and proceeding is terminated in favor of
         plaintiff). Other authorities have limited the tort to process of a type that
         compels ‘‘the performance or forbearance of some prescribed act.’’ (Internal
         quotation marks omitted.) Long v. Long, 136 N.H. 25, 31, 611 A.2d 620 (1992);
         see Board of Education of Farmingdale Union Free School District v.
         Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Assn., Inc., Local 1889, AFT AFL-CIO,
         38 N.Y.2d 397, 400–404, 343 N.E.2d 278, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975); see also 1
         Am. Jur. 2d 492, Abuse of Process § 2 (2016) (‘‘ ‘process,’ the abuse of
         which may support an abuse of process claim, is not limited to the original
         pleadings; depositions, motions, interrogatories and other requests for dis-
         covery, or legal maneuverings to compel or prohibit action by an opponent
         all invoke the authority of the court and are, therefore, the type of process
         that will support an abuse of process claim’’ (emphasis added)).
Page 102                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                March 29, 2022

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