Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582 (2022)

Citation: Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582 (2022)
Parent Document: Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582 (2022)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2022-03-29
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10278647/dorfman-v-smith/ ↗

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club.’’ W. Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law
           of Torts (5th Ed. 1984) § 121, p. 898; accord Preferred
           Properties, Inc. v. Indian River Estates, Inc. 276 F.3d
           790, 801–802 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 959, 122
           S. Ct. 2663, 153 L. Ed. 2d 838 (2002); see also Board of
           Education of Farmingdale Union Free School District
           v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Assn., Inc., Local
           1889, AFT AFL-CIO, supra, 404 (‘‘[L]egal procedure
           must be utilized in a manner consonant with the pur-
           pose for which that procedure was designed. [When]
           process is manipulated to achieve some collateral
           advantage, whether it be denominated extortion, black-
           mail or retribution, the tort of abuse of process will be
           available to the injured party.’’). A number of courts
           have held that this definition is capacious enough to
           include an attempt by an insurance company to use legal
           procedures to bully the opposing party into abandoning
           litigation or settling it favorably. See General Refractor-
           ies Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 297, 308
           (3d Cir. 2003) (if severe enough, using litigation process
           to harass, drain resources, delay payment and delay
           litigation can constitute abuse of process); Crackel v.
           Allstate Ins. Co., 208 Ariz. 252, 260, 92 P.3d 882 (App.
           2004) (‘‘[The plaintiffs] maintain that [the defendant
           insurer] used the prospect of sustained and expensive
           litigation as a ‘club’ in an attempt to coerce them, and
           other similarly situated claimants, to surrender those
           causes of action that sought only modest damages. We
           have little trouble concluding that such a use of court
           processes would be improper.’’); Givens v. Mullikin ex
           rel. Estate of McElwaney, 75 S.W.3d 383, 401 (Tenn.
           2002) (‘‘a primary desire to harass and cause unneces-
           sary expense to the other party in litigation is a sufficient
           ulterior motive to constitute an abuse of process’’);
            Givens v. Mullikin ex rel. Estate of McElwaney, supra,
           401–402 (insurer’s intent to weaken claimant’s resolve
           to pursue litigation is improper purpose); see also Bull
March 29, 2022                  CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                        Page 103

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